IDN
Also known as: Internationalized Domain Name, internationalised domain name, IDNA, UTS #46
An IDN (Internationalized Domain Name) is a domain name containing characters outside ASCII, which is carried through DNS as an ASCII xn-- form produced by the IDNA processing defined in UTS #46.
Overview
DNS has always been restricted to letters, digits and hyphen, so an IDN is not stored as Unicode anywhere in the system. It is converted to an ASCII form before it reaches a resolver, and converted back for display. The conversion is defined by UTS #46 and has four steps: map every character, normalise the result to NFC, split it into labels, then validate and Punycode-encode each label that needs it. Punycode is only the last step, and mistaking it for the whole process is why so many converters disagree with the address bar.
The mapping step is where the real behaviour lives. Uppercase folds to lowercase; compatibility characters collapse to plain ones, so fullwidth example maps to example and the fi ligature becomes fi; a handful of characters like the soft hyphen are discarded entirely; and some are disallowed outright. Then NFC normalisation matters more than it looks: 'café' can be four code points or five depending on whether the accent is precomposed, the two are visually identical, and both turn up in practice — HFS+, the Mac file system until 2017, stored every filename decomposed, and APFS preserves whichever form a name was created in, so decomposed names copied off older Macs are still common. Without the normalisation pass they encode to two different domains.
IDNA changed once, and the change still shows. IDNA2003 folded ß to 'ss' and final sigma ς to σ, so straße.de and strasse.de were one domain. IDNA2008 keeps both characters, making them separate registrations — but browsers did not move together. Firefox and Safari switched in 2016, and Chrome kept the old mapping until Chrome 110 in 2023, so for seven years typing faß.de opened one site in Chrome and a different one in Firefox. Registries responded by bundling or blocking the variant pairs, which is why owners of such names tend to hold both spellings. These are called deviation characters, and any tool that converts a name containing one is quietly choosing which era to answer for.
Two validity rules are commonly skipped and both cause real rejections. CheckBidi (RFC 5893) requires a label containing right-to-left text to be consistently ordered, so an Arabic or Hebrew label with a stray Latin letter is invalid even though each character is allowed on its own. CheckJoiners (RFC 5892) permits a zero-width joiner only directly after a virama, and a zero-width non-joiner after a virama or between two Arabic joining letters, because anywhere else they are invisible and serve only to make two distinct names look identical.
Common questions about IDN
What is the difference between IDN, IDNA and Punycode?
Why does my internationalised domain not resolve?
Are emoji domains real?
Why is my domain shown as xn-- in the browser?
Does an IDN need a special TLS certificate?
Tools that work with IDN
Related concepts
Punycode
Punycode is the encoding defined by RFC 3492 that represents a Unicode string using only the letters, digits and hyphen that DNS allows, producing the xn-- labels that carry internationalised domain names.
Unicode normalization
Unicode normalization rewrites text into one standard sequence of code points, so strings that look identical — é stored as a single precomposed character, or as e followed by a combining accent — compare as equal. Unicode defines four normalization forms: NFC, NFD, NFKC and NFKD.
Homograph attack
A homograph attack uses characters that look identical to others — Cyrillic а in place of Latin a — so that a different domain, username or identifier appears to be a trusted one. Browsers defend domain names by showing the xn-- form of names that look suspicious instead of the Unicode spelling.